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Abstract. Emerging blockchain technology is a promising platform for imple-
menting smart contracts. But there is a large class of applications, where blockchain
is inadequate due to performance, scalability, and consistency requirements, and
also due to language expressiveness and cost issues that are hard to solve. In this
paper we explain that in some situations a centralised approach that does not rely
on blockchain is a better alternative due to its simplicity, scalability, and perfor-
mance. We suggest that in applications where decentralisation and transparency
are essential, developers can advantageously combine the two approaches into
hybrid solutions where some operations are enforced by enforcers deployed on–
blockchains and the rest by enforcers deployed on trusted third parties.
Keywords: Smart Contracts, Blockchain, Monitoring, Enforcement, On chain,
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1 Introduction
This paper focuses on scenarios where two or more parties interact with each other to
conduct business over the Internet. Typical scenarios involve consumers and providers
where the latter sell tangible items or computing services to the former. A specific ex-
ample is the selling of personal data collected from IoT sensors or social media applica-
tions to data consumers. We assume the business parties involved are reluctant to trust
each other unguardedly, that is; without software mechanisms that assure 1) parties act
according to some agreed upon rules, and 2) performed actions are indelibly recorded
on means that make them undeniable and examinable, for example, to determine the
sequence of actions that led to an unexpected outcome and subsequent dispute.
In conventional business, the mechanisms normally used in these situations are busi-
ness contracts supported by ledgers. The contract stipulates what actions the parties are
expected to execute, while the ledger is used to record the history of the actions that have
been executed. It is widely accepted that equivalent mechanisms are also needed in elec-
tronic business. An emerging solution that is currently being explored to address this
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question is smart contracts built on the basis of blockchain technologies [1] [2]. Exam-
ples of such technologies are Bitcoin [3], Ethereum [4] and Hyperledger [5]. However,
blockchain-based smart contracts are only at their initial research stage, and plagued
with questions about their scalability, performance, transaction costs and other ques-
tions that emerge from their decentralised nature.
This article makes the following contributions to help clarify some of these issues.
i) We explain that there are different approaches to implement smart contracts ranging
from centralised to decentralised. ii) We explain the advantages and disadvantages of
these approaches and argue that their suitability in solving the problem depends on the
particularities of the application, the assumptions made about the application, and the
facilities offered by the blockchain technology available. iii) We argue that there is a
large class of applications that can benefit from a hybrid solution.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a contract
example to motivate the use of smart contracts. In Section 3, we introduce smart con-
tracts and describe the difference between the centralised and decentralised variations.
Section 4 discusses implementation alternatives of smart contracts. Section 5 places
our work within past and current contexts. In Section 6, we present some concluding
remarks and raise questions that in our view, need research attention.
2 Motivating scenario
An illustrative example of a contractually regulated IoT application of our research
interest is shown in Fig. 1. Alice is a person in possession of personal data that she
would like to sell and as such she plays the role of a Data seller. The Data Buyer
(represented by Bob) is a company interested in buying data from Alice. Alice gathers
her data from different sources, such as her social network activities, body sensors and
domestic sensors, as envisioned in [6]. For simplicity and to frame the discussion, we
assume that Alice is trading only her data collected from her domestic sensors. We
assume that Alice stores her data in a personal repository, perhaps located in the cloud.
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Like in the ”Hat” project [7], we assume Alice is the absolute owner of the data and
that she is entitled to negotiate with potential buyers how to trade her data, i.e., to
whom to sell it to, when, and under which conditions. The negotiation process can be
as sophisticated as needed. Since this issue falls outside of the scope of this paper, we
consider only a simple accept or reject the offer as it is negotiation process. An example
of contractual clauses that Alice and Bob can use to regulate their data trading follows:
1. The buyer (Bob) is entitled to present the data seller (Alice) with offers to buy data
collected from Alice’s domestic sensors.
2. The data seller is free to use her discretion to either reject the offer or accept the
offer as it is.
(a) The data seller is expected to send a notification of offer acceptance within 36
hrs of receiving the offer, when she decides to accept it.
(b) Failure to send a notification will be considered as offer rejection.
3. The data buyer is obliged to send the payment to the data seller within 24 hrs of
receiving the notification of acceptance.
(a) Failure to meet his obligation will result in an abnormal termination of the
agreement to be sorted out off line.
4. The data seller is obliged to send a notification of payment acceptance to the data
buyer within 24 hrs of collecting the payment.
(a) Failure to meet his obligation will result in an abnormal termination of the
agreement to be sorted out off line.
5. The data seller is obliged to make the data available to the data buyer within 24
hrs of collecting the payment and maintain the data repository accessible during
the following seven days.
6. The Data buyer is entitled to place data requests against the data seller repository
without exceeding 24 data requests per day.
7. The data buyer is entitled to close the repository upon expiration of the seven day
period.
8. This agreement will be considered successfully complete when the seven day period
expires.
The clauses include several contractual operations that we have highlighted in bold
such as offer to buy data, reject the offer, accept the offer, send a notification of offer ac-
ceptance, send payment, etc. Though the clauses are relatively simple, they are realistic
enough to illustrate our arguments.
3 Smart contracts: background
A smart contract is an event–condition–action stateful computer program, executed be-
tween two or more parties that are reluctant to trust each other unguardedly. It can be
regarded as Finite State Machine (FSM) that keeps a state that models the development
(from initiation to completion) of a shared activity. For instance, in [8] [9], the state is
used for modeling changes in rights, obligations and prohibitions as they are fulfilled or
violated by the parties.
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Fig. 2. Centralised and decentralised implementation of a smart contract.
Research on executable contracts can be traced back to the mid 80s and early
90s [10,11]. In 1997, Szabo used the term smart contract [12] to refer to contracts
that can be converted into computer code and executed. However, commercial interest
in smart contracts emerged only in 2008 motivated by the publication of Satoshi’s Bit-
coin paper [13] that inspired the development of cryptocurrencies, smart contracts and
other distributed applications. Satoshi departed from the centralised approach taken in
previous research and demonstrated how smart contracts can be decentralised.
3.1 Centralised and decentralised smart contracts
Depending on the number of instances (copies) of the smart contract deployed to mon-
itor and enforce the contract we distinguish between centralised and decentralised (dis-
tributed) approaches (Fig. 2). In the figure, A and B are business partners, for example,
Alice and Bob of our contract example of Section 2. SC is the corresponding smart
contract. op stands for operation executed against SC, rp is the corresponding response.
TTP node is a node under the control of a Trusted Third Party. N1, . . . , N4 are un-
trusted nodes. CP stands for Consensus Protocol. As shown in Fig. 2–a), a contract can
be implemented as a centralised application that uses a single instance of the smart con-
tract (SC) running in the TTP node. Besides the disadvantages that a TTP introduces
(single point of failure, trust placed on the TTP, etc.) this approach is comparatively
simpler that the decentralised approach. The decentralised approach relies on a set of
untrusted nodes instead of a single TTP that are used for running several identical in-
stances (shown as SC1, . . . , SC4) of the smart contract. In this approach, A and B are
free to place their operation against any of the instances. The price that the decentralised
approach pays for getting rid of the TTP is that the untrusted nodes must run a consen-
sus protocol to verify that a given operation has been executed correctly, and to keep
the states of SC1, . . . , SC4 identical. Depending on the protocol used, its computa-
tional, communication and performance degradation cost might be unbearable [14] or
its consistency guarantees inadequate [15] to the extent of rendering the decentralised
approach unsuitable.
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4 Implementation alternatives
We will take the example of Section 2 and highlight the advantages and disadvantages
of three implementation alternatives.
4.1 Centralised implementation
A centralised implementation is shown in Fig. 3. The role of the SC is played by the
CCC (Contract Compliance Checker) developed at the University of Newcastle. We use
CCC and SC synonymously in this section. The CCC is a FSM written in Java that ac-
cepts contractual clauses encoded as business rules written in the Drools language [8].
The state of the FSM is altered by the execution of contractual operations (op) initiated
by the business partners, such as offer to buy data, and send the payment. The FSM
running within the CCC keeps track of the state of the business process executed be-
tween Bob and Alice, and on this basis it determines if a given operation is contract
compliant (cc) or non contract compliant (ncc). The CCC is used to control the gateway
that grants access to Alice’s data. For example, when Bob wishes to access Alice’s data,
he i) issues the corresponding operation against the gateway, ii) the gateway forwards
the operation to the CCC, iii) the CCC evaluates the operation in accordance with its
business rules that encode the contractual clauses and responds with either cc or ncc
to open or close the gateway, respectively, iv) the opening of the gateway allows Bob’s
operation to reach the data repository and retrieve the response (rp) that travels to Bob.
Note that, to keep the figure simple, the arrows show only the direction followed by
operations initiated by Bob.
It is worth elaborating the following points. Observe that in the architecture, all
the operations are presented to the SC for evaluation. The operation rate is not a prob-
lem because the architecture involves only a single instance of the SC, i.e., there is no
need to run consensus protocols. Likewise, the contract clauses, which are encoded in
the Drools languages, are executed by a FSM implemented in Java. This means that
we have a Turing complete programming environment that allows us to encode and
implement clauses of arbitrary complexity. Unfortunately, the centralised approach in-
troduces several drawbacks. For example, the contracting parties need to trust the TTP
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Fig. 4. Decentralised smart contract.
to collect undeniable and indelible records of the actions executed by the contracting
parties and make them available upon request to parties that are entitled to see them,
say to sort out disputes. At the technical level, the TTP is a single point of failure. An-
other issue is that the execution of the payment operation is centralised. We assume a
conventional card payment mediated by a bank as opposed to cryptocurrency payment.
4.2 Decentralised implementation
A decentralised architecture is shown in Fig. 4. Four instances of the smart contract
(SC1, . . . , SC4) are deployed in four nodes N1, . . . , N4 (one each) of a blockchain
platform. Each operation initiated by a business partner is executed against the con-
tract; the contract determines if the operation is contract compliant (cc) or non contract
compliant (ncc) and responds to both business partners accordingly. The response is
also sent to the gateway to open or close it, accordingly.
To keep the figure simple, we show only the communication lines between the Data
buyer, SC1 and the gateway; and between the Data seller, SC3 and the gateway. Yet we
assume that a given operation can be presented to any of the four instances of the smart
contract and that any of them can respond to the business partners and the gateway.
The salient feature of the decentralised implementation is the replication of the
smart contract, consequently, there is no dependency on a single party. The cost to pay
for this benefit is the execution of the consensus protocol among the instances which
can significantly impact the performance of the smart contract in terms of number of
operations (called transactions in blockchain terminology) per second that it can anal-
yse, and the response time to complete a transaction. For example, Bitcoin, a public
blockchain that uses a Proof of Work (PoW) consensus algorithm, can only process
about 7 transactions per second. Another problem with Bitcoin is its consistency la-
tency: its PoW algorithm offers only eventual consistency that might take Bitcoin about
an hour (or longer) to approve and indelibly include a transaction in its blockchain [16].
Ethereum operating under PoW consensus suffer from similar drawbacks. Permissioned
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Fig. 5. Hybrid smart contract.
blockchains like Hyperledger rely on lighter consensus algorithms such as Proof of
State (PoS). However, applications where eventual consistency is unsafe, demand strong
consistency [15]. Strong consistency can only be delivered by communication intensive
consensus protocols such as Byzantine Fault Tolerant protocols. Unfortunately, these
protocols suffer from scalability issues [14]. Some smart contract applications (for ex-
ample, applications that require instantaneous payment or the delivery of real time data)
fall within this category. Another issue that impacts decentralised approaches that rely
on public blockchains is the transaction fee incurred by each operation analysed by the
smart contract. In this order, it would be insensible to take a decentralised implementa-
tion approach for the contract example of Section 2 if the data buyer was to place a large
number of operations to retrieve small pieces of data under stringent time constraints.
4.3 Hybrid implementation
Fig. 5 shows the architecture of a hybrid implementation. It combines features from the
centralised and decentralised approaches discussed, respectively, in Sections 4.1 and
4.2. We separate the contractual operations into two classes: decentralised operations
(d–op) that need blockchain support and operations that can be executed in a centralised
fashion (c–op). d–op operations are encoded using the decentralised approach and en-
forced by the instances (SC1, . . . , SC4) whereas operation of the c–op category are
encoded using the centralised approach and enforced by the CCC.
The designer separates the contractual operation into d–op and c–op on the basis
of several criteria. As examples, we can mention some key parameters related to the
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blockchain technology. The list is meant to be illustrative rather then exhaustive. Com-
plementary advise is discussed in [17,18] where they take into account privacy concerns
along with computation and data storage costs.
One decision criterion is the expressiveness of the language used for writing the
contract. For instance, if the blockchain does not offer a Turing–complete language, the
implementers needs to keep the d–op category simple. Bitcoin for example, offers only a
stack–based opcode scripting language that does not support loops or flow control struc-
tures. In contrast, in a blockchain platform like Ethereum that offers a Turing–complete
language the designer can afford to pass as much complexity to the decentralised part of
the figure as she wishes to. Another decision criterion is the transaction fee which is an
issue in private blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum but not in Hyperledger [19] when
it is operated as a permissioned blockchain. For example, Bitcoin and Ethereum have
already experienced average transaction fees of 54.90 and 4.15 USD, respectively [20].
Another central parameter to take into account is the performance of the blockchain,
for example, the number of transactions per second and consistency requirements as
explained in Section 4.2. Operations that demand strong consistency would be good
candidates to be implemented as c–op. The performance of the blockchain is especially
relevant to IoT applications where transactions must be automatically monitored to en-
sure that they perform under strict Quality of Service requirements. For example one
could easily imagine an additional clause being added to the contract in Section 2 re-
quiring the repository to process each request for data at a particular rate that would
be too fast to be monitored using a smart contract deployed on a blockchain. In such
a scenario, a centralised smart contract would be more logical, whereas the blockchain
would be used to record important milestone events such as the sending and receipt of
payments for received data. We envision that the centralised and decentralised integra-
tion can be operated in several ways, including the following:
Indelible blockchain–based log We can operate the blockchain–based part of Fig. 5
as a passive log that records events that the parties consider worth duplicating in the
blockchain as well as in the TTP node. By passive we mean that SC1, . . . , SC4 are
not involved in enforcing activities—this is entirely the responsibility of the CCC. This
arrangement is useful when one or more of the contracting parties is reluctant to trust
the TTP blindly, say because it is deployed within the buyer’s premises.
In this arrangement, the d–op set will include operations aimed at creating additional
records while c–op will include all the contractual operations like in 4.1. The CCC and
SC1, . . . , SC4 operate independently from each other.
Cryptocurrency–based payment channel The data buyer of the example of Section 2
can take advantage of payment services offered by a public blockchain (for example,
Bitcoin) and use the top part of Fig. 5 to pay in satoshis. This approach is recommended
only when the payment operation is significantly larger than the transaction fees and is
not repetitive. In this arrangement, the d–op set will include only the send the payment
operation stipulated in clause 3. In this arrangement, the CCC requires the assistance
of the smart contract running in the blockchain (SC1, . . . , SC4) only to verify that the
data buyer has fulfilled his obligation to pay. For instance, the data buyer application
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can submit his payment through Bitcoin, wait for the confirmation of his transaction,
collect the evidence and submit it to the CCC.
Off-blockchain execution of operations In this arrangement the CCC running in the
TTP node is used as an off the blockchain channel. The designer places in the d–op
set only the contractual operations that need decentralised treatment and leaves the re-
maining in the c–op. Naturally, operations that cannot be executed in the decentralised
blockchain because of the issues discussed in Section 4.2 need to be included in c–
op set. A good candidate operation to place in the d–op set is send the payment (see
Section 4.3). Another candidate is close the repository when the data seller wishes to
generate indelible records about the closing time of her repository and completion of
the contract. The remaining operations can be cheaply and efficiently enforced by the
CCC, the inclusion of place data requests (clause 6), in the c–op set is highly desirable
because its recurrence would incur high accumulative transaction fees.
It is worth clarifying that there are some similarities between the deployment shown
in Fig.5 and the lightning channels for executing off–blockchain payments in Bitcoin [21].
However, observe that in lighting networks the aim is to create channels for conducting
micro–payment operations off the blockchain to save on transaction fees. In contrast,
in Fig. 5 we use the CCC (a complete contractual enforcing tool) to execute most of
the contractual operations off–blockchain. Operations from both sets are independently
converted to smart contracts and enforced at run time.
5 Related work
An extended version of this paper can be found here [22]. Research on smart contracts
was pioneered by Minsky in the mid 80s [10] and followed by Marshall [11]. Though
some of the contract tools exhibit some decentralised features [23], those systems took
mainly centralised approaches. Within this category falls [24] and [25]. To the same cat-
egory belongs the model for enforcing contractual agreements suggested by IBM [26]
and the Heimdhal engine [27] aimed at monitoring state obligations (see clause 5 of the
contract example, maintain the data repository accessible). Directly related to our work
is the Contract Compliant Checker reported in [8] [9] which also took a centralised ap-
proach to gain in simplicity at the expense of suffering from all the drawbacks that TTPs
inevitably introduce. Smart contracts were known as executable contracts or electronic
contracts in [28] [29] [30], where the important issues of smart contract representa-
tion and verification were discussed. A pioneering implementation of a decentralised
contract enforcer is discussed in [31]. The central idea is the use of a distributed mid-
dleware that is responsible for keeping indelible records of the operations executed by
each party. The middleware (called Business to Business Objects [32]) is in essence an
indelible ledger similar in functionality to the hyperledger used by current blockchains.
The publication of the Bitcoin paper [13] motivated the development of several plat-
forms for supporting the implementation of decentralised smart contracts. Platforms in
[3], [4], and [5] are some of the most representative. A good summary of the features of-
fered by these and other platforms can be found in [2]. Though they differ on language
expression power, fees and other features discussed in Section 4.2 they are convenient
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for implementing decentralised smart contracts. The hybrid approach that we suggest
addresses problems that neither the centralised or decentralised approach can address
separately and was inspired by the off–blockchain payment channel discussed in [21,3].
Similar to our work also is Ekiden, a system for combining blockchains with Trusted
Execution Environments (TEEs) [33]. The authors report significant performance im-
provements however they do not discuss the challenges of testing and verification hybrid
smart contracts. The concept of logic–based smart contracts discussed in [34] has some
similarities with our hybrid approach. They suggest the use of logic–based languages
in the implementation of smart contracts capable of performing on–chain and off–chain
inference. The difficulty with this approach is lack of support of logic–based languages
in current blockchain technologies. In our work, we rely on the native languages offered
by the blockchain platforms, for example, Ethereum’s Solidity.
6 Conclusions and Future Research Directions
The central aim of this paper is to argue that conventional business contracts can be
automated (at least partially) and that depending on several factors, the centralised ap-
proach suits some applications but others demand decentralised implementations or
even hybrid implementations. We are only starting to explore hybrid implementation
of smart contracts, yet on the basis of the study of the APIs (JSON–RPC) that Bitcoin,
Ethereum and Hyperledger offer, the idea seems implementable [35]. Also, it is of prac-
tical interest as it would offer a pragmatic answer to the scalability problems that afflict
current blockchain platforms. This approach opens several research questions.
An important issue is the interaction between the centralised (CCC) and decen-
tralised components. In Fig. 5 they cannot communicate directly. We are currently
working on a version of the CCC that can be deployed as a micro–service capable of in-
teracting with the JSON-RPC Client API that blockchain technologies offer. Precisely,
we are investigating how the hybrid architecture can be realised using the Ethereum
blockchain and a CCC implemented as a decentralised application (DApp) [36]. The
relationship (directly or indirectly) between the CCC and the blockchain raises several
questions that need further investigation. They can interact directly, indirectly, tightly
or loosely. Fig. 5 suggests the latter where, for example, the CCC can fail and recover
while the send the payment operation is taking place through the block–chain based
smart contract (recall in Bitcoin it might take longer that 24 hrs to complete a transac-
tion). However, in some applications a tight relationship might be desirable to hold or
divert the progress of one of the contracts when its counterpart experiences an exception
or fails. Therefore it is important to develop an understanding on how to separate the
contractual operations into c–op and d–op in a manner that the two contracts collabo-
rate instead of conflicting with each other. For contracts with scores of clauses, this issue
might require the assistance of model–checking tools to ensure that the whole contrac-
tual clauses are consistent and that the two sets do not conflict with each other [37,38].
Another issue is the language for writing the contract. It is arguably accepted that
declarative languages (rule based languages in particular) are more convenient than im-
perative languages to encode contractual clauses. This feature is enjoyed by the CCC.
However, current blockchain platforms support only imperative languages (for example
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Ethereum’s Solidity). This means that in our hybrid approach the contract will be writ-
ten in two different languages which will make their interaction less intuitive. Therefore
ideally blockchain platforms should support declarative languages, or alternatively de-
velopers should be offered a declarative language that can be automatically translated
to languages like Solidity or Drools as needed.
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